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Potential Fall Out From the National 
Acid Precipitation Assessment Program 
l. INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Congress, as part of the Acid Precipitation Act of 
1980,1 created the National Acid Precipitation Assessment 
Program (NAP AP). The program was designed to identify the 
causes and sources of acid rain, to evaluate its environmental, 
social, and economic effects and to assess potential methods of 
control.2 As the NAPAP neared its conclusion it was hoped 
that the results of the study would shift the focus of the nation-
al debate from whether there should be a new acid rain control 
program to how that program should be designed.3 
Ten years and $540 million later, the results are in, and 
nobody's happy. Environmentalists claim the results under-
estimate the impact of acid rain on the environment and on the 
economy.4 Industry is upset because Congress has passed new 
legislation which seems to ignore the results of the NAPAP. 
This paper will examine the possible application of those re-
sults to two aspects the of Clean Air Act: International Air 
pollution under §115 and National Ambient Air Quality Stan-
dards under §108. 
II. CONSULTING THE EXPERTS 
According to some studies, damage due to acid deposition 
is extensive.5 The World Resources Institute claims that "[e]-
xtensive death of U.S. forests and $5 billion in annual crop 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 8901-8912 (1988). 
2. 42 u.s.c. § 8903 (1988). 
3. Larry Blackwood, A Conceptual Framework for an Acid Rain Control Pro-
gram, 19 ENVTL. L. REP., (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10166 (1989). 
4. Ozone, Acid Rain Causes Extensive Damage to U.S. Crops, Forests, WRI 
Says in Report, 20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1779 (1990). 
5. Amy Fraenkel, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution: 
Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 447, 449 
(1989) (citing MOLSKI & DMUCHOWSKI, EFFECTS OF ACIDIFICATION OF FORESTS AND 
NATURAL VEGETATION, WILD ANIMALS AND INSECTS, ACIDIFICATION AND ITS PoLICY 
IMPLICATION 29, (T. Schneider ed. 1986); Cameron, International Cooperation and 
Acid Rain Pollution: Establishing the Framework for Control 18 INT'L J. ENVTL 
STUD. 129 (1982). 
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losses are attributable to acid rain and ozone pollution."6 Ac-
cording to the Institute's report, Air Pollution's Toll on Forests 
and Crops, studies such as the NAPAP "underestimated the 
impact of air pollution on forests and crops."7 Apparently, an 
increase in chronic stress to the forest can result in a complete 
ecosystem collapse in which trees lose their resistance to pollu-
tion and fail to reproduce. Some claim that this has already hap-
pened in Ontario and Tennessee near high emission sources.8 
The concern over acid rain is not limited to North America. 
One recent assessment estimates that the damage caused by 
acid rain in Europe to forests, lakes, materials, crops and hu-
man health ·combined exceeds $13 billion annually.9 
The studies on acid rain are extensive. However, despite 
the "more than 3,000 acid rain studies in North America and 
Europe, some scientist feel there is not enough evidence to 
prove the cause and effect relationship between acid rain and 
environmental damage.'>IO Presently, there is sharp disagree-
ment in the scientific community regarding the extent of the 
damage being caused by acid rain (if any) and the cost of acid 
rain reduction. 
For example, with respect to lakes, cause and effect is par-
ticularly difficult to prove because acidification of lakes is a 
naturally occurring event. 11 According to Edward C. Krug, soil 
scientist with Illinois State Water Survey, "highly acidic lakes 
[are] common throughout the world, especially in New Zealand 
and Australia."12 While acknowledging that "some lakes in 
New York's Adirondack Mountains are acidic," Krug asserts 
that this is "due to causes other than acid rain."13 
Krug claims that the Adirondack lakes had historically 
been acidic until alkaline soot from massive logging and burn-
ing early in this century neutralized the lakes' acidity. 
6. 20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1779 (1990). 
7. ld. 
8. Timothy Stein, Acid Rain: The Clean Air Act Cannot Handle the Problem, 
56 UMKC L. REV. 139, 142 (1987) (citing S. Postel, Air Pollution, Acid Rain, 
WORLD WATCH PAPER, N. 58, 28 (1984)). 
9. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON 
FuTURE 180, 181 (1987). See also, MCCORMICK, ACID EARTH: THE GLOBAL THREAT 
OF ACID POLLUTION 6 (1985). 
10. Stein, supra note 8, at 143. 
11. ld. at 140 (citing A. Labastille, Acid Rain: How Great the Menace? NATL. 
GEOGRAPillC 653, 660, 670-71 (Nov. 1981)). 
12. Conservative Coalition Criticizes Air Bill, 20 ENV'r. REP. (BNA) 2002 (1990). 
13. ld. 
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The lakes were then stocked with fish and were seen to be 
thriving. But now, he [says], they are returning to their nor-
mal, acidic state and acid is leaching into the lakes-but not 
from acid rain. Instead he point[s] to highly acidic, peaty 
forest floors through which water passes. 14 
If Krug is right, the acidification of the lakes in the Adirondack 
Mountains cannot be stopped by clean air legislation. 
Scientists also disagree about the extent of the damage 
acid rain causes to materials such as buildings and statues. 
Some scientists claim that "acidic deposition is only one con-
tributor to degradation of construction materials, [and that] 
such damage generally can be prevented by maintenance or 
other measures."15 Uncertainty in this area makes cost-benefit 
analysis of acid rain prevention difficult at best, unreliable at 
worst. 
With respect to the cost of acid rain prevention some have 
estimated that reducing sulfur dioxide (S02) by fifty-five to 
sixty-five percent by the year 2000 from 1980 levels would cost 
from $4.6 billion to $6.7 billion per year. 16 However, J. 
Laurance Kulp, an environmental consultant and former head 
of the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program dis-
agrees. He claims that "acid rain reduction costs in [the Clean 
Air Act] could run to $100 billion over the next 10 years."17 
Considering the vast differences among experts, the controver-
sy surrounding the NAPAP should come as no surprise. 
A. The NAPAP to the Rescue? 
In the spring of 1988, the NAPAP released an interim 
report concluding that "little further damage to forests and 
waterways would result from acid rain."18 Within weeks, 
Kulp, former head of the NAPAP, resigned. 19 Members of Con-
gress, environmentalists, and the Canadian government ac-
cused him of "watering down the report's conclusion and exec-
utive summary."2° Kulp had "urged Congress to await the 10-
14. ld. 
15. Acid Rain's Role in Lake, Stream Acidity, 21 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 844 (1990). 
16. See supra note 9. 
17. See 20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 2002 (1990). 
18. ld. 
19. ld. 
20. ld. 
426 B.Y. U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 6 
year NAPAP final study" before passing new clean air legisla-
tion.21 Edward Krug, soil scientist with Illinois State Water 
Survey, also urged Congress to wait.22 Congress pushed 
through the Clean Air Act before the final study was released. 
The new head of the NAPAP, James R. Mahoney, was sub-
jected to similar treatment. Columnist Warren Brookes alleged 
that EPA Administrator William K. Reilly had forced Mahoney 
to change his congressional testimony on acid rain and that 
Mahoney had "cooked the books" on S02 emissions.23 Brookes 
claimed that Mahoney wanted to tell Congress that "the effects 
of increased, decreased and constant [acid] deposition are not 
statistically significant."24 Instead, Mahoney told Congress 
that "emission reductions would benefit aquatic resources and 
would mitigate other environmental effects."25 In all, Brookes 
claimed that Mahoney made 19 rewrites in his report.26 In a 
letter to Congressman John D. Dingell (D-Mich.), Mahoney de-
nied the allegations.27 Whether Brookes was right is now aca-
demic. In the end, Congress passed a comprehensive acid rain 
deposition reduction program and ignored $540 million worth 
of research. 
Although Congress has ignored the results of its own 
study, there may be other uses for the NAPAP. 
B. International Air Pollution and the NAPAP 
Much of the acid rain which falls in eastern Canada has its 
origin in the United States. Section 115 of the Clean Air Act is 
designed to remedy that problem. 28 For section 115 to take ef-
fect, however, the EPA Administrator must find, based on sci-
entific studies, that the public welfare of Canada is endangered 
by acid rain emitted from the United States. Courts could use 
the NAPAP as a basis for evaluating EPA's findings. 
In New York v. Thomas29 environmental groups tried to 
21. ld. 
22. ld. 
23. San Francisco Chronicle Dec. 6 (1989), p. 7/Zl. 
24. ld. 
25. ld. 
26. ld. 
27. NAPAP Head Answers Allegations, 20 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 1646 (1990). 
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1990). 
29. 613 F. Supp. 1472 (D.D.C. 1985) rev'd by Thomas v. New York, 802 F.2d 
1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986) rev'd by Her Majesty The Queen v. The Environmental 
Protection Agency, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
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compel the EPA to take action under section 115. However, 
they failed in part because the courts were reluctant to compel 
the EPA to act while the results of the NAPAP were still pend-
ing. Now the results are here and the NAPAP could play a 
major role in determining how the Clean Air Act is implement-
ed. 
1. The provisions of the Act 
Section 115(a) of the Clean Air Act provides that: 
[ w ]henever the Administrator, upon receipt of reports, sur-
veys or studies from any duly constituted international agen-
cy has reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants 
emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollu-
tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare in a foreign country . . . the Administrator 
shall give formal notification thereof to the Governor of the 
State in which such emissions originate.30 
The Administrator's finding-that pollution emitted in the 
United States contributes to such air pollution-is referred to 
as an "endangerment finding."31 
Under section 115(b), the notice to the governor of the 
state in which such emissions originate is deemed to be a find-
ing that its State Implementation Plan ("SIP") under the Clean 
Air Act is inadequate and must be revised to the extent neces-
sary "to prevent or eliminate the endangerment referred to in 
subsection (a)."32 This process is referred to as an "SIP revi-
sion."33 
The remedy provided by section 115 is applicable "only to a 
foreign country which the Administrator determines has given 
the United States essentially the same rights with respect to 
the prevention or control of air pollution occurring in that coun-
try as is given that country by this section."34 This determina-
tion is known as a "reciprocity finding''. 35 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1990). 
31. 912 F .2d at 1528. 
32. 42 u.s.c. § 7415(b) (1990). 
33. 912 F.2d at 1538. 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) (1990). 
35. 912 F.2d at 1538. 
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2. The EPA relies on the experts 
In January 1981, shortly before the Reagan Administration 
took office, EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle wrote two 
letters, one to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie and one to 
Senator George Mitchell.36 In the letter to Secretary Muskie, 
Administrator Costle concluded that "acid deposition is endan-
gering public welfare in the U.S. and Canada and that U.S. 
and Canadian sources contribute to the problem not only in the 
country where they are located but also in the neighboring 
country."37 Administrator Castle's endangerment finding was 
based on the Seventh Annual Report on Great Lakes Water 
Quality issued by the International Joint Commission (IJC),38 
an organization established by the United States and Canada. 
The IJC is a "duly constituted international agency" for purpos-
es of section 115(a). 39 Costle also concluded that there was 
reciprocation between the United States and Canada.40 In his 
letter to Senator Mitchell, Costle stated that his conclusions on 
endangerment and reciprocity were "adequate to warrant the 
initiation of a section 115 based plan revision process in appro-
priate States" and that he had instructed his staff "to develop 
recommendations regarding the States which should receive 
formal notification."41 All the elements appeared to be in place 
for compelling the EPA to take action. 
3. The environmentalists take action 
In 1984, several environmental groups, and private citizens 
filed suit under section 304(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act.42 The 
groups claimed that Administrator Costle had made endanger-
ment and reciprocity findings in 1981 and that the EPA was 
therefore required under section 115 to take action. The EPA 
argued, inter alia, that its decision to take action is discretion-
ary because it "requires the fusion of technical knowledge and 
skills with judgment which is the hallmark of duties which are 
36. New York v. Thomas, 613 F. Supp. 1472, 1486 (D.D.C. 1985). 
37. ld. at 1488. 
38. ld. 
39. 912 F.2d at 1529. 
40. 613 F. Supp. at 1488. 
41. ld. at 1492. 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1990). 
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discretionary."43 The district court granted summary judgment 
for the plaintiffs holding that the letters constituted both en-
dangerment and reciprocity findings under section 115 and that 
the EPA's decision to take action was nondiscretionary. 
However, the court treated the binding effect of the reci-
procity finding differently than that of the endangerment find-
ing. The court stated that "a [reciprocity] finding under the 
statute must be based on an analysis of facts and law as they 
exist at a particular time and that a change of either facts or 
law might require reexamination of the determination."44 The 
court then allowed the EPA to reassess Administrator Costle's 
reciprocity finding to "determine whether Costle's conclusion 
remains viable.'>45 The court did not, however, allow the EPA 
to reassess Costle's endangerment finding but rather ordered 
the EPA to "give formal notification to the Governors of the 
states in which harmful emissions originate and to set in mo-
tion the necessary processes to require a plan revision so as to 
prevent or eliminate the endangerment encompassed by the 
Castle determinations."46 Although not specifically stated, the 
court's reasoning for this distinction seems to rely more on 
Costle's letters than on the language of section 115. 
In his letter, Costle stated that his reciprocity determina-
tion "could be changed should the U.S. conclude that future 
Canadian actions interpreting or implementing their legislation 
were not giving essentially the same rights to the U.S."47 This 
statement by Castle, however, only supports the idea that reci-
procity findings should be reassessed. It does not explain why 
an endangerment finding is binding on future EPA Administra-
tors. Indeed, it would appear that the language of the statute 
requires the opposite result. 
To make an endangerment finding the Administrator need 
only have "reason to believe that any air pollutant or pollutants 
emitted in the United States cause or contribute to air pollu-
tion which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare in a foreign country .... "48 A reciprocity 
finding, on the other hand, requires the Administrator to "de-
43. 613 F. Supp. at 1485-86. 
44. !d. at 1483. 
45. !d. at. 1484. 
46. !d. at 1486. 
47. !d. at 1483. 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1990). 
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termine" that reciprocity exists.49 The court effectively ruled 
that the Administrator's determination can be reassessed but 
his beliefs are final. To disallow reassessment of the 
Administrator's endangerment finding, the basis of which was 
no more than a reason to believe, is unreasonable considering 
the debate over the effects of acid rain and the fact that the 
NAPAP was, at the time of the court's decision, in the middle 
of studying the problem. One might suspect that Judge John-
son, who wrote the opinion, had already decided that acid rain 
endangered the public welfare of Canada. Regardless of Judge 
Johnson's possible bias, her decision would have prevented the 
EPA from ever basing an endangerment finding on the NAPAP 
report. Costle's endangerment finding was final. 
In Thomas v. New York, 50 the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia reversed, but for different reasons. Judge 
Scalia, writing for the Court of Appeals, held that Administra-
tor Costle's endangerment and reciprocity findings were "rules" 
under the Administrative Procedure Act51 (APA) and there-
fore, could not be promulgated without notice and comment 
procedures. 52 Since the Costle findings had not been subjected 
to these procedures, they could not serve as the basis for judi-
cial relief. 53 Scalia did not address the issue of whether the 
EPA was obliged to promulgate such findings, nor did he ad-
dress their validity. In fact, Scalia concluded that "[h]ow and 
when the agency chooses to proceed to the stage of notification 
triggered by the findings is within the agency's discretion and 
not subject to judicial compulsion."54 Scalia cited no authority 
for this conclusion. It appeared from Scalia's opinion that the 
EPA could not be compelled to act absent a showing of an 
abuse of discretion. The EPA would be free to look at any 
study, including the NAPAP, and ignore or accept Costle's 
findings. Although only dicta, this statement seemed to reverse 
Judge Johnson's decision to not allow reassessment of Costle's 
endangerment finding. 
Undaunted, the petitioners next filed petitions for 
rulemaking with the EPA under section 553(e) of the APA,55 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (1990). 
50. 802 F.2d 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
51. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1988). 
52. 613 F. Supp. at 1446-48. 
53. ld. 
54. ld. at 1448. 
55. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1988). 
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requesting that the EPA promulgate endangerment and reci-
procity findings pursuant to section 115 of the Clean Air 
Act.56 The petitioners asserted that four reports of duly con-
stituted international agencies supported an endangerment 
finding, that the reciprocity requirements section 115(c) had 
been satisfied, and that Administrator Costle had specifically 
made both endangerment and reciprocity findings which had 
never been revoked by the EPA. The EPA declined to act on the 
petitions. 
Eventually, Don R. Clay, Acting Assistant Administrator 
for Air and Radiation, responded in writing (insisting however 
that he was not speaking for the agency but only for himself). 
In his letter, Clay stated: "I do not believe that EPA presently 
has a sufficient information base to undertake the regulatory 
program required by section 115 . . . . For that reason, . . . I 
believe it would be premature to rule on your petition at this 
time."57 In Her Majesty the Queen v. United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 58 petitioners sought review of the Clay 
letters as final agency action denying their petitions for 
rulemaking. Petitioners asserted that the denial of their peti-
tions for rulemaking was "arbitrary" and "capricious".59 Peti-
tioners believed that a decision in their favor would force the 
agency to act Costle's endangerment findings. 
4. The Court's Holding 
The holding of Her Majesty is best understood when divid-
ed into three parts. First, the court held that the Clay letters 
were final agency action regarding EPA's interpretation of the 
statute60 and that EPA's interpretation was permissible.61 
Second, the letters were not final agency action regarding 
whether EPA had abused its discretion in denying the petitions 
for rulemaking given the "complexity of the technical and factu-
al issues that the agency is required to address in this case."62 
Third, the EPA did not delay unreasonably in acting on Admin-
istrator Costle's findings given "the permissibility of the EPA's 
56. Her Majesty The Queen v. EPA, 912 F.2d 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
57. ld. at 1530. 
58. ld. at 1525. 
59. Id. at 1530. 
60. ld. at 1531 
61. ld. at 1533-34. 
62. Id. at 1534. 
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[interpretation of section 115] . . . and the undisputed tech-
nical and scientific uncertainties that must be resolved in order 
to trigger section 115."63 
5. The EPA's interpretation 
Petitioners contended that section 115 is a two step process 
and that once step one has occurred (making the endangerment 
and reciprocity findings), step two (notifying the Governors of 
the respective states) must immediately follow. Petitioners' 
interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the stat-
ute which states "[w]henever the Administrator [makes endan-
germent and reciprocity findings] the Administrator shall give 
formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in 
which such emissions originate."64 Since four duly constituted 
international agencies supported an endangerment finding and 
reciprocity still existed, and since Administrator Castle had 
already made endangerment and reciprocity findings65 the 
petitioners claimed the EPA was required to publish rules for 
notice and comment thereby initiating the remedial process 
established by section 115.66 
The EPA interpreted the statute as a unitary or single step 
process that required not only endangerment and reciprocity 
findings but the EPA's ability to identify the polluting source. 
The EPA argued that "the Administrator must have sufficient 
evidence correlating the endangerment to sources of pollution 
within a particular State before he can exercise his discretion 
to make endangerment findings .... "67 In other words, if the 
EPA does not know the source of the pollution, the EPA cannot 
notify the respective governors as the statute requires. The 
court agreed. The court held, inter alia, that: 
The statute thus creates a specific linkage between the en-
dangerment finding and the remedial procedures: Once the 
endangerment finding is made, the SIP revision process must 
follow. As a result, if there is insufficient information to en-
able the Administrator to implement those remedies, the 
promulgation of an endangerment finding alone would largely 
63. !d. 
64. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a) (1990). 
65. 912 F.2d at 1530. 
66. ld. at 1528. 
67. !d. at 1533. 
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be pointless. 68 
As construed by the court, section 115(a) should now read: 
Whenever the Administrator. . . has reason to believe [that 
identifiable sources are contributing] to air pollution which may 
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare 
in a foreign country, [then notification of the respective Gover-
nors is required.] Apparently, Castle's findings were real find-
ings, but their effect (requiring the EPA to notify the respective 
Governors) was suspended until the sources of the pollution 
could be identified. 
However, this leaves unanswered the question of whether 
the EPA is permitted to reassess Castle's endangerment find-
ing. The NAP AP was designed to "identify the causes and 
sources of acid rain, to evaluate its environmental, social, and 
economic effects, and to assess potential methods of control."69 
The results of the NAP AP could prove that Castle's endanger-
ment findings were wrong. Nonetheless, the court held that 
there is a "specific linkage between the endangerment finding 
and the remedial procedures" and once the endangerment find-
ing is made, the SIP revision process "must follow". The court 
seemed to be saying that the only ingredient lacking was suffi-
cient "information to enable the Administrator to implement" 
section 115. It appeared that ten years and $540 million worth 
of research had been rendered useless by two letters from Ad-
ministrator Castle. 
a. The Clay letters were not final agency action regarding 
whether EPA abused its discretion in denying the petitions for 
rulemaking. Petitioners contended that there was enough evi-
dence to constitute the necessary endangerment and reciprocity 
findings, that the findings had already been made by Adminis-
trator Castle, and that EPA's denial of their petitions for rule 
making constituted final agency action and an abuse of dis-
cretion. According to the court, "the agency [had] not made any 
final decision on whether endangerment and reciprocity find-
ings [could] be made, nor [had] it conclusively determined 
whether it [could] adequately trace pollutants to specific sourc-
es in order to issue SIP revision notices."7° From this state-
ment the court appears to recognize the distinction between 
68. !d. 
69. !d. at 1535; See also 42 U.S.C. § 8903 (1990). 
70. 912 F.2d at 1534. 
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"making an endangerment finding'' and "identifying specific 
sources of pollution" and that the EPA had done neither. How-
ever, because the court recognized the EPA's unitary interpre-
tation of the statute, the findings were interdependent and 
could not be made separately. True, Castle had already made 
endangerment and reciprocity findings, but they were ineffec-
tive until the EPA could identify the polluting sources. Howev-
er, the court did not state whether the EPA could find that no 
endangerment was present thereby overruling Castle. The 
court only stated that the EPA had not yet made the finding. 
b. The EPA did not delay unreasonably in acting on Ad-
ministrator Costle's findings. The petitioners claimed that the 
EPA had "delayed unreasonably" in acting on Castle's findings. 
It had been nine years since Castle had made his endanger-
ment finding and the EPA had not acted. 71 The Administra-
tive Procedures Act requires that an agency "proceed to con-
clude a matter presented to it [within] a reasonable time.'m 
Petitioners claimed that nine years of inaction was unreason-
able. 
The court held that the EPA had not delayed unreasonably 
in part because of the pending results of the NAPAP. Mter 
noting the "unusual complexity of the factors facing the agency 
in determining the effects of acid rain and in tracing the pollut-
ants from the point of deposition back to their sources,"73 the 
court stated: 
It was for the purpose, among others, of developing a better 
understanding of the acid rain phenomenon that Congress en-
acted the Acid Precipitation Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8901-
8912 (1982). 
[The program] is designed to identify the causes and 
sources of acid rain, to evaluate its environmental, social, and 
economic effects, and to assess potential methods of control. 
See 42 U.S.C. section 8903 .... At oral argument the EPA 
pointed to this study as evidence of specific research being 
conducted that could enable the agency to take action under 
section 115; the EPA also asserted that the report should 
provide it with a sufficient basis to make a reasoned decision 
on the petitioners' rulemaking petitions. 
It is in part on the basis of this information that we con-
71. !d. 
72. 5 U.S.C § 555(b) (1988). 
73. 912 F.2d at 1534. 
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elude that the EPA's delay in acting on the petitions has been 
neither arbitrary, nor capricious, nor contrary to law.74 
This statement has tremendous potential. For example, the 
phrase "to evaluate its environmental, social, and economic, 
effects" might mean the EPA could use the NAPAP to reassess 
Costle's endangerment finding. However, the phrase "could 
enable the agency to take action under section 115" implies the 
NAPAP will simply enable the EPA to identify the sources of 
pollution. It is unclear what the status of the Costle endanger-
ment finding is. Only the judges know for sure. 
Congress spent $500 million to identify the causes and 
effects of acid rain. The EPA could try to use the NAP AP to 
over rule Costle's endangerment finding, courts permitting. Or 
it could find the results inconclusive and proceed to act once 
the sources of pollution are identified. The decision would seem 
to depend on the administrator and who he or she wants to be-
lieve: Congress' $500 million study or the environmentalists. 
III. NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY 
STANDARDS AND THE NAPAP 
Acid rain is caused by 802 and water vapor. 802 is one of 
the pollutants for which the EPA is required to establish Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQ8). In establish-
ing those standards, the EPA is to "take into account all the 
relevant studies revealed in the record" and "make an informed 
judgment based on available evidence."75 The NAPAP is the 
most recent study regarding the effects of 802 on the environ-
ment and could be used to challenge the NAAQ8 for 802 as 
established by the EPA. 
To date, the EPA's standards for S02 have yet to be chal-
lenged. However, in Natural Resources Defense Counsel v. 
EPA,76 petitioners did challenge EPA's selection of primary 
and secondary NAAQ8 for PMlO. Although the pollutant is dif-
ferent, the procedure for challenging the NAAQ8 is the same. 
This case provides a useful analogy as to what role the NAPAP 
might play in challenging NAAQS for S02. 
74. Id. at 1534-35. 
75. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982). 
76. 902 F.2d 962 (D.C.Cir. 1990). 
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A. The Provisions of the Act 
Under section 108 of the Act, the EPA is to identify air 
pollutants that are emitted from "numerous or divers" sources 
and whose presence in the ambient air "may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.'m The EPA 
has identified 802 as one of those pollutants.78 
For each pollutant, the EPA is required to issue a "criteria" 
document reflecting its health and welfare effects and a "con-
trol techniques" document discussing the costs and benefits of 
different types of emission controls. 79 The criteria document, 
which serves as the basis for establishing the pollutant levels, 
must "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful 
in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on 
public health . . . which may be expected from the presence [of 
particulate matter] in the ambient air, in varying quanti-
ties.''80 The NAPAP could be regarded as "the latest scientific 
knowledge" regarding the effects of 802 and NO, the prime 
ingredients in acid rain. 
Under section 109, the EPA must issue "primary" and "sec-
ondary" NAAQS for each pollutant identified under section 
108.81 The primary standards must protect the public health 
while allowing an adequate margin for safety; the secondary 
standards must protect the public welfare from any known or 
anticipated adverse effects.82 Under the Clean Air Act, all lan-
guage which refers to the effects on "public welfare" includes, 
but is not limited to "effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, 
manmade material, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and 
climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards 
to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on 
personal comfort and well-being."83 In setting a standard un-
der section 109, the Administrator must "take into account all 
the relevant studies revealed in the record" and "make an in-
formed judgment based on available evidence.''84 The NAPAP 
77. 42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(1) (1990). 
78. 40 C.F.R. 50.4 (1990). 
79. 42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(2), (b)(1) (1990). 
80. 42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(2) (1990). 
81. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a)(2) (1990). 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1990). 
83. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (1990). 
84. American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982). 
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is such a study. 
B. The EPA Sets the Standard. 
In 1986, the Environmental Criteria and Assessment Office 
reviewed scientific studies on the health effects of PM10.85 
Based on these studies, the EPA's Office of Air Quality Plan-
ning and Standards recommended that the Administrator con-
sider a twenty four hour standard at levels between 140 Jlg/m3 
to 250 Jlg/m3 and annual standards at levels between 40 Jlg/m3 
to 65 Jlg/m3.86 On July 1, 1987, after a lengthy notice and 
comment period and the issuance of several supplemental pro-
posals, the EPA issued the final rule revising the NAAQS for 
particulate matter.87 The EPA selected 50 Jlg/m3 as the annu-
al standard and 150 Jlg/m3 as the 24-hour primary standards 
for PM10.88 
In December 1988, the EPA denied petitions for reconsider-
ation of various aspects of the revised primary and secondary 
standards for PM10.89 In Natural Resources, 90 the petitioners 
appealed claiming the Administrator's selection of the twenty-
four hour and annual national primary ambient air quality 
standards for particulate matter, measured in PM10 was arbi-
trary and capricious and sought to have them revised.91 
1. The petitioners' argument 
The petitioners claimed that the Administrator's selection 
of the standards was arbitrary ''because he provided no basis 
for distinguishing the health effects associated with the levels 
selected from those associated with the levels rejected."92 Peti-
tioners asserted that the "only reliable scientific evidence 
shows that standards at the highest levels proposed [250 
Jlg/m3] would still protect the public health, including sensitive 
subgroups of the population, with an adequate margin of safe-
ty."93 Petitioners believed that the levels selected were too 
85. Natural Resources Defense Consel v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). 
86. !d. 
87. See 52 Fed. Reg. 24,643-45 (1990). 
88. !d. at 24,641-45. 
89. 665 F.2d at 967. 
90. 902 F.2d 962. 
91. !d. at 967. 
92. !d. at 968. 
93. !d. (quoting Brief amicus curie of the American Iron and Steel Institute at 
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low and that the EPA had ignored certain studies. The studies 
showed that a standard of 250 pg/m3 rather than 150 pg/m3 
would be "well below the levels where a scientific consensus 
accepts pollution as responsible for some unknown amount of 
life shortening among the elderly and persons with pre-existing 
respiratory or cardiac disease. "94 
2. The EPA's argument 
The EPA acknowledged that the Lawther study indicated 
that a PM10 standard of 250 pg/m3 might contain some mar-
gin of safety and that the London Mortality study indicated 
that 250 pg/m3 would be "well below" the pollution levels that 
produced "excess mortality" in London. However, the EPA con-
cluded that because other studies indicated adverse health 
effects below 250 pg/m3, and because of differences between 
the United States and London in particulate composition, and 
because of difficulties in converting from British Smoke (the 
indicator for particulate matter used in the London and 
Lawther studies) to PM10 measurements, those studies could 
not be relied upon exclusively.95 
In issuing the final rule which established the NAAQS, the 
Administrator concluded that a twenty-four hour PM10 stan-
dard greater than 150 pg/m3 would "present an unacceptable 
risk of premature mortality" and allow the possibility of signifi-
cant I ung function changes. 96 
3. The standard of review 
The court stated that in reviewing the agency's determi-
nation it "must carefully review the record to ascertain that the 
agency has made a reasoned decision based on 'reasonable 
extrapolations from some reliable evidence."'97 This standard 
goes farther than simply requiring the Administrator to "con-
sider" or "take into account" all of the available studies. The 
20, Natural Resources 902 F.2d at 968). 
94. ld. at 969 (citing Lawther, Waller & Henderson, Air Pollution and Exacer-
bations of Bronchitis, 25 THORAX 525 (1970); Martin & Bradly, Mortality, Fog and 
Atmospheric Pollution-An Investigation During the Winter of 1958-59, 19 MONTHLY 
BULL. MINISTRY HEALTH LAB. SERV. 56 (1960); Martin, Mortality and Morbidity 
Statistics and Air Pollution, 57 PROC. ROYAL Soc'y MED. 969 (1964)). 
95. See 52 Fed. Reg. at 24,643 (1990). 
96. ld. 
97. 902 F.2d at 968 (quoting National Resources Defense Council v. Thomas, 
805 F.2d 410, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 
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standard requires that the decision be a "reasoned" one based 
on "reasonable extrapolations". This requires a substantive 
rather than procedural review of the Administrator's decision. 
Although not articulated by the court, the reason for this high 
level of scrutiny is probably because the criteria document, 
which serves as th::J basis for establishing the pollutant levels, 
must "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge useful 
in indicating the kind and extent of all identifiable effects on 
public health ... which may be expected from the presence [of 
particulate matter] in the ambient air, in varying quanti-
ties."98 The reviewing judge, therefore, must determine the 
accuracy of the Administrators decision. This constitutes a 
higher standard of review when compared to the abuse of dis-
cretion standard employed by the court in Her Majesty the 
Queen.99 
4. The court's holding 
The court held that the EPA's selection of the twenty-four 
hour standard was reasonable in light of the conflicting studies 
and the agency's mandate to provide an adequate margin of 
safety. 100 However, as required by the standard of review, the 
court did not leave EPA free to arbitrarily choose the various 
levels. 
While noting that the decision of the Administrator "did 
not spring from a bounty of definitive research,"101 the court 
held that such is not required. The court stated, that "[t]he 
Administrator is required to provide an adequate margin of 
safety. And '[i]n setting margins of safety the Administrator 
need not regulate only the known dangers to health, but may 
'err' on the side of overprotection by setting a fully adequate 
margin of safety."'102 This statement implies that regulating 
unknown dangers in the name of overprotection is required for 
the margin of safety to be fully adequate. This also seems to 
contradict the standard of review employed by the court. Under 
that standard, the Administrator's decision must be based on 
98. 42 U.S.C § 7408(a)(2) (1990). 
99. 912 F.2d 1525. 
100. 902 F.2d at 969. 
101. 902 F.2d at 972. 
102. !d. at 968 (quoting American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1186, 1186 
(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034, (1982)). 
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"reasonable extrapolations from some reliable evidence", 103 
and that evidence is contained in the criteria document which 
must "accurately reflect the latest scientific knowledge". 104 
There seems little room for regulating unknown dangers. None-
theless, the court grants the EPA the power. 
The NAPAP might be used by industry to challenge 
NAAQS for 802. However, the success of the challenge will 
probably rely not on the standard of review or on the statutory 
requirements but on whether the judge believes that regulating 
unknown dangers in the name of overprotection is required to 
provide a fully adequate margin of safety. The political predi-
lections of judges and of the EPA are much more crucial than 
the results of scientific studies. 
IV. CLEAN AIR ACT TO THE RESCUE? 
In 1990, Congress passed legislation amending the Clean 
Air Act. The amendments leave in place the provisions con-
cerning International Air Pollution and National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards discussed above. However, as part of that 
legislation, Congress enacted the Acid Deposition Control pro-
gram (ADC).105 The ADC is much more specific in its instruc-
tion to the EPA regarding the control of acid rain through the 
reduction of 802 emissions. In fact, the EPA is given no discre-
tion regarding the dangers of acid rain. 
Despite the controversy over the effects of acid rain, the 
Congress found that "the presence of acidic compounds and 
their precursors in the atmosphere and in deposition from the 
atmosphere represents a threat to natural resources, ecosys-
tems, materials, visibility, and public health."106 How Con-
gress made this finding is not stated in the amendments to the 
Clean Air Act, and it would appear that this finding directly 
contradicts the results of the NAPAP. Congress should have 
said it "declares" rather that it "finds". 
Why Congress chose to ignore the results of the NAPAP in 
amending the Clean Air Act is not clear. It could be that Con-
gress does not trust the EPA to protect the environment. It 
could be that Congress does not trust the courts to protect the 
environment. It could be that reducing acid rain and 802 emis-
103. 902 F.2d at 968. 
104. !d. 
105. The Clean Air Act Title IV. 
106. !d. at § 401. 
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sions is just the politically expedient thing to do. It could be 
that environmental groups have a very powerful lobby and 
enough money to purchase the necessary influence to get their 
agenda through Congress. Or it could be all of the above. What-
ever the reasons, the controversy continues despite the $500 
million NAPAP study. 
According to Gene E. Likens, Director of the Institute of 
Ecosystems Studies in Millbrook, New York, "it appears that 
the acid rain remedy adopted by Congress . . . is too little too 
late."107 Mr. Likens' "findings" indicate that "the reductions in 
emissions of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides mandated by 
the 1990 amendments are far less than what would be required 
to protect sensitive ecosystems from continuing damage from 
acidic rain, snow, fog and dust."108 Likens claims that the 
new protections are inadequate because "[t]hey were not scien-
tifically based; they were chosen on political and economic 
grounds."109 
Of course, not everyone agrees with Mr. Likens. "A 
spokesperson for the Edison Electric Institute, an association of 
the electric utilities that must bear the brunt of emissions 
control requirements, said that 'nothing in the NAP AP report 
supports [Likens's analysis]."'110 The spokesperson asked not 
to be identified. James Mahoney, the former director of 
NAPAP, added, "I don't hear [Likens's] scientific colleagues ar-
guing that the reductions were not enough."111 
The usefulness of the NAPAP study is now unclear. Al-
though it might be used to challenge endangerment findings 
under section 115 of the Clean Air Act, or to challenge NAAQS 
as promulgated by the EPA under section 108, the courts might 
be prompted to ignore it; after all, Congress ignored it in pass-
ing the Clean Air Act. Yet Congress hasn't lost all confidence in 
the NAPAP. Congress recently assigned the NAPAP to monitor 
the effectiveness of the new Clean Air Act controls. 112 If the 
NAPAP has been unable to identify the causes and effects of 
acid rain, its ability to monitor the effectiveness of the new acid 
107. Philip Shabecoff, Acid Rain: Are the Remedies Adequate to the Problem, 
American Political Network, Inc. Greenwire, Dec. 16, 1991. 
108. !d. 
109. !d. 
110. !d. 
111. !d. 
112. Acid Rain Program Shifts Gears to Study Effectiveness of Air Act S02 
Limits, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT DAILY, (BNA), Jan. 16, 1992. 
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rain controls is doubtful. Maybe Congress should create a pro-
gram to monitor the effectiveness of the NAPAP. They could 
call it the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program. 
Steve Russell 
